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Article 
Towards a New Jus Post Bellum: The 
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 
and the Improvement of Post-Conflict 
Efforts and Accountability∗ 
Liliana Lyra Jubilut∗∗ 
The creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission and the United Nations Human Rights Council is 
the main institutional outcome of the United Nations (UN) 
reforms adopted upon the 60th anniversary of the organization.1 
The need for the Peacebuilding Commission arose due to the 
evolution in the UN’s post-conflict efforts since the Cold War.2 
Examples of these efforts include the UN missions in Cambodia, 
Angola, Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor,3 where the activities 
ranged from monitoring elections4 to conducting the complete 
administration of the territory.5 
 
∗ Earlier versions of this paper were presented to Prof. Simon Chesterman’s Selected 
Problems in United Nations Law: State-building, governance and accountability 
seminar at New York University School of Law (2006) and, in Portuguese, as a 
chapter in my PhD thesis (2007) which was later published in Brazil (2010). The 
author would like to thank Prof. Simon Chesterman, Ronli Sifris, Marjolein 
DeBacker and Catherine Sweeter for their comments, assistance and suggestions. 
∗∗ PhD and Master in International Law—Universidade de São Paulo; LL.M in 
International Legal Studies—New York University School of Law;  University 
Professor (Faculdade de Direito do Sul de Minas- Brazil) 
 1. See generally 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/L.1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/L.1, ¶¶ 97-105, 157-160 (Sept. 16, 2005) (describing the need for these 
bodies, the institutional makeup, and their purpose). 
 2. See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED 
NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING 238 (2004). 
 3. Id. at 238-39. 
 4. See Id. at 66 (“The agreement required Indonesia to make arrangements, 
with the assistance and participation of the UN Representative and his staff, to give 
the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice in 
determining their future.”). 
 5. See Id. at 238 (“The fact that [civil administration] operations continue to 
JUBILUT Formatted -fixed JDM 12/10/2010  2:09 PM 
2011] TOWARDS A NEW JUS POST BELLUM 27 
Nevertheless, the evolution of international law connected 
with “peacebuilding” has not kept pace with on-the-ground 
developments. There are two reasons for this gap: (1) the lack of 
an institutional framework within the UN to deal with post-
conflict efforts, and (2) the lack of a clear normative framework 
to deal with the justice of conduct after war—both for clarifying 
the existing rules (i.e. a modern jus post bellum) and for reasons 
of accountability. 
The lack of an institutional framework is relevant because 
the UN is the organization with both a responsibility for 
international peace and security6 and a clear mandate to 
promote human rights.7 The problem created by a lack of a 
normative framework is twofold. First, given the diversity of 
recent post-conflict efforts, the norms of both international 
humanitarian law and the law of occupation are often 
inapplicable or insufficient. Because the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of international law are constantly being challenged, 
especially in light of the changed circumstances brought about 
by the war on terror,8 it is both necessary and timely to 
establish a clear normative framework.9 Second, the normative 
framework is related to the question of accountability, a 
pervasive issue in international legal debates. The appearance 
of a lack of accountability in post-conflict efforts tends to 
weaken their legitimacy and efficacy. Therefore, enhancing 
accountability mechanisms is a relevant task. These gaps 
between theory and practice are inter-related and bridging one 
of them requires taking actions to bridge the other. This paper 
suggests that the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission10 is 
a starting point in this direction, as the Peacebuilding 
 
be managed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations . . . .”). 
 6. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. 
 7. Human rights are part of the UN Charter (preamble, para 2) but the 
central role the organization plays in this area derive from its practice throughout 
the years, which can be exemplified by the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; the sponsorship of several international treaties (such as the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political and on Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights) and its field work.  See Id. pmbl, (espousing the common goals that define 
members of the U.N.). 
 8. E.g., Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN 
AFF.  May/June 2003, 16, 16 (“[I]t became clear that the grand attempt to subject the 
use of force to the rule of law had failed.”). 
 9. Cf. Id. at 31 (describing variables that need to be taken into account in a 
new normative framework for the Security Council). 
 10. See generally G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 30, 2005) 
(establishing the Peacebuilding Commission). 
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Commission may play an important role in both of these areas. 
In fact, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission 
in order to bridge the above-mentioned gaps.11 It can aid in the 
development of a modern jus post bellum by assisting the 
creation of a framework of principles and rules for post-conflict 
efforts.12 Furthermore, it can enhance accountability by both 
adding transparency to post-conflict efforts and by establishing 
a principled way of assessing these efforts.13 The area of 
accountability is where the Peacebuilding Commission may be 
most effective. As posited above, however, because all areas are 
inter-related, advancing one aspect of post-conflict efforts means 
advancing the legal treatment of all of them. 
In order to develop this thesis, this paper is divided into 
four sections. The first will briefly describe the history of the 
Peacebuilding Commission, highlighting the changes in UN 
involvement in post-conflict efforts, including an assessment of 
the differences between the proposals made prior to the 
Commission’s creation and the body as it was actually created. 
The second section will discuss whether the Peacebuilding 
Commission can realistically carry out its mandate, given the 
gap between theory and practice in the international law of jus 
post bellum. The third section will explain how the 
Peacebuilding Commission can play the role of doctrinal and 
practical gap-filler in the law of jus post bellum by creating a 
normative framework for evaluating post-conflict efforts. The 
paper will conclude with a brief discussion of the mechanisms of 
accountability that the Peacebuilding Commission can use to 
enforce the normative framework that this paper proposes. 
Above all else, this paper seeks to underline the belief that, 
given the right support, the Peacebuilding Commission can 
make a meaningful contribution to a modern jus post bellum, 
both in terms of theory and practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11. See Id. pmbl., para. 2 (outlining the purposes of the Peacebuilding 
Commission). 
 12. See Id. para. 2(c). 
 13. See Id. para. 13. 
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I. THE CREATION OF THE UN’S PEACEBUILDING 
COMMISSION 
A. THE EVOLVING CIRCUMSTANCES AND RECENT NATURE OF 
POST—CONFLICT EFFORTS LED THE UN TO CREATE THE UN 
PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION 
The UN was created with the main purpose of establishing 
a collective security system that would replace the unilateral 
use of force by states.14 It is in order to fulfill this taks that the 
Security Council was vested in the role of guardian of 
international peace and security.15 The cornerstone of the 
system was the limitation on the recourse to force.16 This 
approach was based on three underlying factors: (1) respect for 
the sovereignty of Member States;17 (2) the idea that the biggest 
threat to international peace and security derived from inter-
state conflicts;18 and (3) a narrow definition of the concept of 
peace.19 
With the advent of human rights, globalization, changes in 
the concept of sovereignty, and the end of the Cold War, these 
underlying factors evolved and the UN approach to 
international peace and security was forced to adapt.20 New 
concerns arose, such as (1) internal conflicts, (2) the lack of 
capacity of some states to protect their own population and to 
perform the inherent tasks of governance, and (3) gross and 
systematic violations of human rights by states.21 The UN was 
 
 14. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST 
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 2 (2002) (“[T]he UN Charter . . . is quite clear-eyed 
about its intent: to initiate a new global era in which war is forbidden as an 
instrument of state policy, but collective security becomes the norm.); David M. 
Malone & Ramesh Thakur, UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?, 7 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 11, 12 (2001) (discussing the primary responsibility of the UN). 
 15. UN Charter preamble para 6; art 1. para 1; art. 2 para 6; and art. 24 
 16. Id. art. 2, para. 4, art. 51. 
 17. See Franck, supra note 14, at 7 (discussing the Charter’s treatment of State 
Sovereignty). 
 18. Id. at 20 (discussing the Charter’s treatment of conflict). 
 19. Id. at 138(discussing a balance between peace and justice). 
 20. See RICHARD CAPLAN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF WAR-TORN 
TERRITORIES: RULE AND RECONSTRUCTION 5-8 (2005) (elucidating on the impetus for 
increased UN intervention for humanitarian crises). 
 21. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, at 4-6 (2001) (reporting the findings of the independent Canadian 
commission regarding new problems involving international security). 
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forced to broaden not only its concept of peace22 but also its 
actions on behalf of peace,23 so as to ensure international peace 
and security. 
On one hand, the UN began to link peace to economic and 
social development—as well as non-discrimination and 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms—thereby 
addressing not just conflicts themselves but their root causes.24 
On the other hand, the UN started to perform some functions 
that might be characterized as interventions in internal affairs 
in the reserved domain of the domestic jurisdiction of the 
Member States.25 These activities ranged from monitoring 
elections,26 to oversight of trust territories,27 to oversight of peace 
agreements,28 to the entire reconstruction of societies, as in the 
state-building missions in Kosovo and East Timor.29 
Due to the expansion of their scope, scholars have 
categorized such activities into three generations of post-conflict 
efforts. According to Simon Chesterman: 
[I]n the heady days of the early 1990s, traditional or ‘first generation’ 
peacekeeping, which was non-threatening and impartial, governed by 
 
 22. See CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 5-6 (pointing out the inclusion of human 
rights abuses as a measure for peace by states). 
 23. See Id. at 9 (“International intrusiveness, as a consequence, has extended 
well beyond coercive intervention . . . .”). 
 24. E.g., Sonia K. Han, Building a Peace That Lasts: The United Nations and 
Post-Civil War PeaceBuilding, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 837, 838 (1994) 
(referencing changes in peace-building outlined by UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali). 
 25. These activities, in fact, are not the domain of domestic jurisdictions, since 
it is international law that decides which issues are of its own concern and the UN 
organs responsible for peace and security determine whether intervention is 
necessary in a given situation following the accepted rule that the UN organs are 
responsible for interpreting their own competencies.  See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (5th ed. 1998) (“[T]he rule that a state cannot 
plead provisions of its own law or deficiencies in that law in answer to a claim 
against it for an alleged breach of its obligations under international law . . . .”). 
 26. E.g., Press Release, Security Council, Iraq Special Representative Tells 
Security Council “We have grounds for optimism” Following Recent Successful 
Provincial Elections, U.N. Press Release SC/9602 (Feb. 26, 2009) (“[T]he elections 
have been a flagship of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq . . . .”). 
 27. For instance in the cases of what are now Togo and Ghana. CHESTERMAN, 
supra note 2, at40. 
 28. E.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes 
Deployment of United Nations-African Union ‘Hybrid’ Peace Operation in Bid to 
Resolve Darfur Conflict, U.N. Press Release SC/9089 (July 31, 2007) (“The Council, 
acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized UNAMID to 
take the necessary action to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
. . . .”). 
 29. Han, supra note 24, at 839. 
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the principles of consent and minimum force, was swiftly succeeded by 
two further generations. Second generation or ‘multidimensional’ 
peacekeeping was used to describe post-cold war operations in 
Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Angola, but, retrospectively, 
might also have included the Congo operation in 1960–4. Third 
generation peacekeeping, sometimes called ‘peace enforcement’, 
operating under a chapter VII mandate, began with the Somalia 
operation. The genealogy was curious—the third generation appearing 
a mere six months after the second—but the terminology also 
misleadingly suggested a linear development in peacekeeping 
doctrine.
30
 
This broadening of the organizational mandate and 
obligations changed the face of post-conflict efforts undertaken 
by the UN.31 As Chesterman points out, these changes were not 
met with an adequate doctrine or an adequate internal 
structure within the UN.32 This led to redundant efforts and lack 
of coordination. 
In addition, the fundamental link between peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding was acknowledged theoretically,33 and the 
perception that focusing on prevention could lead to effectively 
diminishing the number of conflicts arose.34 Both concepts 
contributed to positive change in UN post-conflict efforts, but 
also created difficulties for a system already lacking uniformity. 
This situation was perceived to be problematic insofar as it 
became clear that the UN involvement in post-conflict efforts 
would recur for the foreseeable future and that the organization 
needed to be prepared to act adequately.35 Moreover, the fact 
that post-conflict efforts were always undertaken on an ad hoc 
basis without a holistic approach helped to emphasize the need 
 
 30. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 238. 
 31. Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, From Congo to East Timor in Forty Years: The 
UN Finally Crossing the Rubicon Between Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making?, 4 
NEWCASTLE L. REV. 45, 46-47 (1999); Ivan Šimonović, Post-Conflict Peace Building: 
The New Trends, 31 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO., Summer 2003, at 251, 254. 
 32. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 7. (“[W]ith some members of the Council and 
the wider UN community apparently allergic to the development of doctrine.”). 
 33. See Ademola Abass, Book Review, 7 J. Conflict & Security L. 137 (2002) 
(“[T]he UN realized that peacekeeping and peace-building is tantamount to merely 
providing a reprieve for parties to regroup and go back to the battlefield at a future 
date.”). 
 34. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 21, at XI.  
See Šimonović, supra note 31, at 256 (speaking to the importance of peace-building 
efforts after conflict to prevent it from occurring again). 
 35. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 7.  See generally Rep. of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared 
responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (detailing an exhaustive study of 
UN obligations and recommendations on how to meet them). 
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for change in the UN.36 The UN always seemed to be reacting to 
crises in a “practice-leading-the-theory approach.”37 
Hence, internal actions were necessary to rectify this 
situation. However, there was opposition to such actions based 
on the fear that the more the UN prepared to act, the more the 
organization would be asked to act.38 Absent consensus on 
whether, when, and how this involvement should take place, it 
was argued that the organization should refrain from further 
actions.39 Despite such opposition, the view that the UN would 
be involved in post-conflict efforts, with or without a clear 
consensus on the nature of its involvement, prevailed.40 The UN 
began to acknowledge that it had a unique role to play in 
connection with peacebuilding, and that it needed to undertake 
actions to rectify its previous failures.41 
Beginning the assessment of the situation, the Report of the 
Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, 
and Change stated that: 
Our analysis has identified a key institutional gap: there is no place in 
the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse 
and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war 
to peace . . . . The United Nations unique role in this area arises from 
its international legitimacy; the impartiality of its personnel; its 
ability to draw on personnel with broad cultural understanding and 
experience of a wide range of administrative systems, including in the 
developing world; and its recent experience in organizing transitional 
administration and transitional authority operations.
42
 
This analysis led to the creation of a Peacebuilding 
 
 36. See Malone, supra note 14, at 12 (“The Security Council must move beyond 
its current pattern of reaction and address potential crises holistically and at their 
origin before violence breaks out.”).  See also CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 45 
(indicating underlying reasons for ad hoc efforts). 
 37. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 48. 
 38. See Id., at 55-56, 238 (“[T]he Secretariat faces an unpleasant dilemma: to 
assume that transitional administration is a transitory responsibility, not prepare 
for additional missions and do badly if it is once again flung into the breach, or to 
prepare well and be asked to undertake them more often because it is well 
prepared.”). 
 39. Id. at 238 (remarking on the ambivalent stance on post conflict operations 
within the Secretariat). 
 40. Id. at 55 (“Despite the ‘evident ambivalence’ among member states and 
within the UN Secretariat, the Report noted that the circumstances that demand 
such operations were likely to recur . . .”). 
 41. See, for instance, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
supra note 35, in which “ways of strengthening the United Nations to provide 
collective security for the twenty-first century” are proposed.. 
 42. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 35, paras. 
261-262. 
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Commission in order to bridge the gap within the UN regarding 
post-conflict efforts. 
The Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change first proposed the creation of the 
Peacebuilding Committee in a report entitled “A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility.”43 It was  formally adopted by 
the Secretary-General in his report “In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,”44 
approved by the 2005 World Summit Outcome,45 and was 
followed in General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions,46 thus becoming a reality. 
B. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION, AS PROPOSED, DIFFERS 
SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE COMMISSION AS ACTUALLY 
ESTABLISHED 
The proposed and the established Peacebuilding 
Commission are different in several ways,47 most notably that 
the latter seems to be weaker than the former. The proposed 
organ was to have a small membership, formed by experts, with 
early warning capacities and with a new line of resources.48 The 
established organ, however, lost these characteristics during the 
negotiation process, mainly due to the zeal with which Member 
States guard their sovereignty,49 the endemic problem of funds 
in the UN, and the fact that it was part of a bigger reform 
proposal, in which negotiations are based on leverage and 
compromise.50 
The established Peacebuilding Commission meets in two 
 
 43. Id. , para. 263. 
 44. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights For All: Report of the Secretary General, ¶ 116, U.N. 
Doc. A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005). 
 45. World Summit Outcome, supra note 1, para. 97. 
 46. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶1; S.C. Res. 1645, ¶1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
 47. All the differences stem from the analysis of the organ proposed by the 
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled “A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility and the organ established by UN Doc 
A/RES/60/180.  Compare High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
supra note 35, with G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10. 
 48. See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 35, 
para. 261. 
 49. Simon Chesterman, Course at NYU School of Law, Selected Problems in 
United Nations Law: State-Building, Governance, and Accountability (April 17, 
2006). 
 50. Id. 
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forms: an organizational committee and country-specific 
committees.51 The organizational committee is the permanent 
structure of the Peacebuilding Commission and encompasses 
members from within and outside the UN.52 From within the 
UN, the Peacebuilding Commission is made up of: 1) the five 
permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, 
Russia, United Kingdom and United States; 2) two other 
annually elected members of the Security Council,53 currently 
Mexico and Gabon;54 3) seven members of the Economic and 
Social Council elected by that body, currently Australia, Brazil, 
Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Poland and Republic of Korea;55 
4) five top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions to 
the UN, currently, Germany, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands 
and Sweden;56 5) five top providers of military and civilian 
assistance to UN missions, currently Bangladesh, India, Nepal, 
Nigeria and Pakistan;57 and 6) seven members elected by the 
General Assembly,58 currently Benin, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Peru, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.59 The Peacebuilding 
 
 51. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶¶ 3, 4, 7. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8. 
 53. S.C. Res. 1646, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1646 (Dec. 20, 2005).  Contra 
Organizational Committee Members, UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION, 
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mem-orgcomembers.shtml (last visit Sep. 24, 
2010) (stating that the two rotational members of the Security Council will serve two 
years instead of one). 
 54. United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, supra note 53.  The first two 
countries that were elected were Denmark, replaced by Panama, and Tanzania, 
replaced by South Africa.  Rep. of the Peacebuilding Comm’n on its first session, UN 
Peacebuilding Comm’n, 1st Sess., June 23–June 27, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/62/137–
S/2007/458 (July 25, 2007). 
 55. Organizational Committee Members, supra note 53. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. G.A. Res. 60/261, U.N. Doc A/RES/60/261 (May 17, 2006) (showing that the 
election follows the procedure of the resolution). However, as in the case of the other 
mandates, an extension from a one-year to a two-year mandate appears to have 
occurred according to the Commission webpage, Organizational Committee 
Members, U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2010, 6:56PM), 
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mem-orgcomembers.shtml. 
 59. The first group was formed by Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Fiji and Jamaica.  Originally, the Peacebuilding Commission had a representative of 
the UN Secretary-General (Carolyn McAskie – named on May 16th, 2006) but this 
situation seems to no longer exist according to the membership list on the 
Commission’s webpage. It seems that there are representatives of the UN Secretary-
General directly linked to the Commission’s work on specific countries. See 
Organizational Committee Members, UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION, 
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mem-orgcomembers.shtml (last visited Sept. 
16, 2010, 6:56PM); see also Election of Seven Members of the Organizational 
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Commission also has seats for representatives of the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other institutional 
donors.60 
Even more members are added when the Peacebuilding 
Commission sits in its country-specific committees.61 Each 
committee will include seats for the country under 
consideration, countries in the region that are engaged in post-
conflict efforts, other countries engaged in relief efforts and 
political dialogue, the major financial, troop and civilian police 
contributor, the senior UN official in the field, other relevant 
UN representatives, and other relevant regional and 
international financial institutions.62 
The justification for the size of the committees is the belief 
that all the relevant decision-making actors involved in post-
conflict efforts—including military and economic facets—should 
be present.63 This way the Peacebuilding Commission will work 
as a comprehensive forum in accordance with its mandate.64 
However, the increase in size may jeopardize the work of the 
Peacebuilding Commission, which may become slow and 
inefficient due to the fact that its decisions are made by 
consensus.65 
The Peacebuilding Commission was created as an advisory 
body.66 To aid its functioning, a support office (from within the 
Secretariat and the existing resources of the UN67) and a 
Peacebuilding Fund were established.68 The Peacebuilding Fund 
 
Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission, September 2009, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Sept. 26, 2010, 6:14PM), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22278/election_of_seven_members_of_the_organizatio
nal_committee_of_the_peacebuilding_commission_september_2009.html (describing 
the initial elections); Carolyn McAskie of Canada Named to Top-Level Peacebuilding 
Support Post, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 24, 2010, 10:24PM), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18509&Cr=peace&Cr1 (discussing 
Carolyn McAskie’s appointment to the peacebuilding support post).. 
 60. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 9. 
 61. The Peacebuilding Commission is working on the specific cases of Sierra 
Leone, Burundi and Guinea-Bissau. Besides these States, the Central African 
Republic is on the Commission’s agenda. See Peacebuilding Commission Agenda, 
U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2010, 4:21PM), 
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/pbcagenda.shtml. 
 62. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 7. 
 63. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 64. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 2. 
 65. Id. ¶18. 
 66. Id. ¶ 1. 
 67. Id. ¶ 23. 
 68. Id. ¶ 24.. 
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was established on October 11, 2006, and has a value of more 
than $348 million,69 surpassing the intended goal of $250 
million.70 The Peacebuilding Commission’s main goals are: 
 
a) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and 
to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict 
peacebuilding recovery; b) to focus attention on the 
reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for 
recovery from conflict and to support the development of 
integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for 
sustainable development; c) to provide recommendations and 
information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors 
within and outside the United Nations, to develop best 
practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early 
recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by 
the international community to post-conflict recovery.71 
The Peacebuilding Commission will focus on 
“reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable 
development, in countries emerging from conflict”72 and 
therefore “is likely to deal only with countries emerging from 
conflict, following the establishment of a peace accord and a 
cessation of violence.”73 This may be construed to mean that 
prevention will not be a major concern of the commission 
(although its relevance in relation to prevention of conflicts was 
highlighted above).74 The UN justifies this more limited focus 
stating that: 
 
 69. UN Peacebuilding Fund: Preventing a Relapse Into Violent Conflict, U.N. 
PEACEBUILDING FUND (Sept. 16, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml. 
 70. Annan Launches Peacebuilding Fund to ‘Kick-Start’ Efforts to Rebuild 
After Conflict (Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.unpbf.org/news-20061011.shtml. As of 
February 28, 2010, the Peacebuilding Fund had 46 States, one international 
organization, and private donors. See Pledges, Commitments and Deposits, U.N. 
PEACEBUILDING FUND (Sept. 16, 2010, 7:24PM), 
http://www.unpbf.org/pledges.shtml. Besides the four States on the agenda of the 
Peacebuilding Commission, supra note 61 and accompanying text, Comoros, Ivory 
Coast, Guinea, Liberia, Nepal, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are eligible for 
resources. Moreover, in emergency situations of threats to peace, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, and Kenya may be assisted; cf. 
Rep. of the Peacebuilding Commission on its First Session, supra note 53. 
 71. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 2. 
 72. Peacebuilding Q&A, U.N. INFO. SERV. (Sept. 17, 2010, 6:13 PM), 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/library_2006peacebuildingt.html. 
 73. Id. 
 74. E.g., International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
supra note 14, at 19-27. 
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The United Nations has played a vital role in mediating peace 
agreements and assisting in their implementation, helping to reduce 
the level of conflict in several regions. However, some of those accords 
have failed to take hold, such as in Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 
1994. Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back 
into violence within five years, driving home the message that, to 
prevent conflict, peace agreements must be implemented in a 
sustained manner. Yet, to date, no part of the UN system has been 
directly responsible for helping countries make the transition from war 
to lasting peace. The Peacebuilding Commission will help fill this gap 
by facilitating an institutional and systematic connection between 
peacekeeping and post-conflict operation and the international 
network of assistance and donor mobilization including the World 
Bank.
75
 
Despite this limitation on its focus, the Peacebuilding 
Commission can nevertheless contribute to the enhancement of 
post-conflict efforts. The following section will describe how it 
should make these contributions. 
II. CAN THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION CARRY OUT 
ITS MANDATE? 
A. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
GAP OF POST—CONFLICT EFFORTS AT THE UN. 
As mentioned, one of the underlying reasons for the 
creation of the Peacebuilding Commission was the recognition of 
an institutional gap within the UN in relation to its post-conflict 
efforts.76 The institutional gap is undeniable, but before 
assessing whether or not the Peacebuilding Commission will be 
able to bridge it, two background issues should be considered: 
(1) whether the UN is best suited to oversee jus post bellum 
issues, and if it is, (2) whether it could have done so with 
existing resources rather than creating a new commission to do 
so. 
1. The UN is uniquely suited to governing post-conflict efforts. 
Why must one focus on the UN as opposed to other 
international actors who are also involved in post-conflict 
 
 75. Peacebuilding Q&A, supra note 72, at no. 11. 
 76. See Questions and Answers, U.N. PEACEBUILDING COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2010, 
8:49 PM), http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/qanda.shtml (the UN itself 
recognizes such a gap qualifying it as “huge”). 
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efforts, sometimes through unilateral actions? The answer to 
this question has both legal and political foundations. Legally 
speaking, the UN is primarily responsible for the maintenance 
of international peace and security because it is the only 
organization that can authorize the use of force.77 It is also the 
only universal organization vested with broad responsibilities in 
relation to human rights. Given the combination of these two 
factors and that post-conflict efforts encompass concerns 
relating to both issues, the UN is the appropriate forum to deal 
with post-conflict efforts, and should, therefore, be prepared to 
act coherently in such situations. 
Furthermore, there are three political reasons why the UN 
is the proper actor to address the issues of jus post bellum. 
Firstly, the UN adds its legitimacy to the post-conflict efforts in 
which it is involved, which is important given that the actions it 
undertakes may appear to be violations of state sovereignty and, 
therefore, touch upon national sensitivities.78 Even when post-
conflict efforts derive from a conflict that may not have been 
authorized by UN, the actors often rely on the UN to assist 
them—one prominent example of this being the current 
situation in Iraq.79 
Secondly, states are often too willing to involve the UN in 
post-conflict efforts because such actions are seldom risk-free. 
That is, the involvement of multinational forces may decrease 
the death toll of one state’s army. At the same time, UN 
involvement may lend credibility to the action being 
undertaken, which may provide political justification for the loss 
of lives.80 
 
 77. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, 2; art. 2, para. 3, 4; art. 24, art. 51. 
 78. The UN has to deal with national sensitivities in all aspects of its work. 
From the type of food that can be handed in humanitarian emergencies to the dress 
codes in some societies to the situations involved in post-conflict efforts. An example 
of such situation is described by Simon Chesterman: “A measure of the speed with 
which the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo was established is the 
name itself. UN operations typically operate under an acronym, but 'UNIAMIK' was 
dismissed as too much of a mouthful. 'UNIAK' sounded like a cross between 'eunuch' 
and 'maniac'—associations judged unlikely to help the mission. 'UNMIK' was the 
final choice, having the benefits of being short, punchy, and clear: only in English, 
however. Once the operation was on the ground, it was discovered that anmik, in the 
dialect of Albanian spoken in Kosovo, means 'enemy'. No one within the United 
Nations was aware of the confusion until it was too late, at which point instructions 
went out to pronounce the acronym 'oon-mik.'” CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 236. 
 79. The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq, WORLD PRESS 
REVIEW ONLINE (Sept. 26, 2010, 4:42 PM), http://www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq. 
 80. More recently this was seen in the attempt of the US to engage the UN in 
the activities in Iraq, both in the context of administration and of peace-keeping, and 
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Finally, given its multicultural composition, the UN can be 
seen as being better suited to undertake such missions because 
it is perceived to be more culturally and historically sensitive. 
Such perception is not only an essential element for the success 
of any mission but is also indispensable in structuring the 
operation and the actions in the first place.81  The importance of 
considering the cultural and historical background of each 
territory before acting is also one of the reasons why it is 
impossible to have a one-size-fits-all post-conflict package. Post-
conflict efforts must adapt to local practices, customs and 
traditions.82 This flexibility is essential,83 not only to avoid 
colonialist or imperialist models, but also to apply, in practice, 
the idea of human rights. Nonetheless, the balance between 
effectiveness and cultural sensitivity adds to the difficulty of 
post-conflict efforts and is a reason why the UN, as an 
organization with experience in post-conflict situations, is 
politically the best choice to undertake them. 
2. Given the complexity of existing agencies, the most efficient 
option was to create the Peacebuilding Commission to govern 
post-conflict efforts. 
The second issue is whether or not a new organ within the 
UN was necessary to the goal of bridging the institutional gap 
connected with post-conflict efforts, or whether a novel approach 
to existing organs would have sufficed. 
Due to the similarities in the post-conflict efforts 
undertaken by the UN, especially in relation to international 
administration of territories and the work that the organization 
has done in pushing decolonization efforts forward (namely the 
organization acting on behalf and in the interest of the people of 
a territory with a view to fostering the development of 
conditions for self-actions), some commentators have argued 
that the UN Trusteeship Council could be the organ to bridge 
 
even in the face of the debate of whether or not the invasion was legal under 
international law. See, e.g., John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 736 
(2004) (discussing the conventional wisdom concerning the legitimacy of the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in connection with the UN’s power to authorize the use of force). 
 81. See CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 12-15; see also CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 
4-5. 
 82. See, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 20; CHESTERMAN, supra note 2.. 
 83. It’s interesting to note that the concept of flexibility is sometimes seen as 
malleability, which is seen as a negative approach as it may lead to “justified” 
violations. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 48. 
JUBILUT Formatted -fixed JDM 12/10/2010  2:09 PM 
40 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 20:1 
the institutional gap of the organization.84 Such a proposal has 
two positive aspects. Firstly, the Trusteeship Council is an 
organ that already exists and reactivation would be far less 
complicated than the process of creating a whole new body. 
Secondly, because the Trusteeship Council was involved in 
decolonization efforts,85 it already has some expertise of acting 
in similar situations and could learn from its own mistakes. 
However, the negative aspects of re-activating the 
Trusteeship Council outweigh the positive ones. Firstly, because 
the organization was once responsible for decolonization efforts, 
its role in post-conflict efforts might be viewed suspiciously by 
former colonies for whom the memory of colonization is still too 
fresh.86 Secondly, the UN charter would need to be amended to 
enable the Trusteeship Council to deal with the current and 
future post-conflict efforts because this document imposes 
limitations on which states can be subjected to the Trusteeship 
Council87—excluding any member of the UN.88 Given that nearly 
all countries in the world are members of the UN,89 for the 
Trusteeship Council to be able to function, an amendment would 
certainly be required. This would be a political nightmare: once 
the UN Charter is open for amendment, it is impossible to 
predict the range of the changes it might undergo, as changes 
are possible in every single article. Thus, the creation of a new 
organ—the Peacebuilding Commission—was a better choice 
than adapting and reinitiating the Trusteeship Council. 
 
 84. See generally Brian Deiwert, A New Trusteeship for World Peace and 
Security: Can an Old League of Nations Idea be Applied to a Twenty-First Century 
Iraq?, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771; Saira Mohamed, From Keeping Peace to 
Building Peace: A Proposal for a Revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (2005) (advancing suggestions for how a revived 
Trusteeship Council could support peacebuilding efforts). 
 85. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 37-47 (describing the history of the UN 
from its founding to Timor Leste). 
 86. This highlights the importance of an international organization like the UN 
being responsible for post-conflict efforts. See Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposals for UN 
Security Council Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 632, 633 no. 13 (“A UN ‘administering 
authority’ could better dispel the well-justified suspicion that arises whenever an 
individual state acts in that capacity; such a state is often suspected of using the 
trusteeship system (and its predecessor, the mandate system of the League of 
Nations era) as a cloak for the promotion of its selfish colonial interests”). 
 87. U.N. Charter art. 76. 
 88. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 47, 55. 
 89. See Member States of the United Nations (Sept. 15, 2010, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (listing the 192 States that are members 
of the UN). 
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B. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS TO EXPECT THAT THE 
PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT ITS 
MANDATE 
Though the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission was 
likely the best choice to promote a new legal framework for jus 
post bellum, it is not without problems.  At the institutional 
level, the main obstacle to be overcome is the fact that the 
Peacebuilding Commission only has recommendatory powers, 
which means that it can only try to persuade relevant actors to 
act,90 which can limit the political force of its acts. Furthermore, 
the Peacebuilding Commission may only act after a request for 
advice from the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General, the 
General Assembly, and the UN Economic and Social Council 
(when the Security Council is not seized of the matter),91 or from 
a Member State regarding the Member State’s own situations if 
the issue is not on the Security Council agenda.92 The 
combination of these two features suggests that the 
Peacebuilding Commission may have limited room for 
independent action. Additionally, it could mean that when it 
acts, its recommendations will lack force. 
Nevertheless, there are at least five reasons for optimism 
regarding the influence of the Peacebuilding Commission. 
Firstly, the Secretary-General can ask for recommendations by 
the Peacebuilding Commission independently of whether or not 
the matter is under consideration by the Security Council.93 This 
is relevant since the role of the Secretary-General has evolved 
throughout the years from the position of a chief administrator 
of the UN to a more active figure in world politics, helping to set 
global agenda.94 This means that if a particular Secretary-
General gives considerable weight to post-conflict efforts and 
relies on the Peacebuilding Commission, there will be room for 
active work on the part of the Commission.95 The inverse would 
 
 90. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 2(c). 
 91. Respecting, therefore Article 12 of the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 12. 
 92. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶ 12. 
 93. General Assembly Resolution 60/180 does not establish limits to the 
requests of the Secretary General to the Commission. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 7, 
¶ 12. 
 94. See generally Paul Szasz, The Role of the UN Secretary-General: Some Legal 
Aspects, 24 NYU J. INT’L. L. & POL. 161 (1991); Ian Johnstone, The Role of the UN 
Secretary General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
441 (2003). 
 95. Bruce Jones, N.Y.U. L. Sch., Lessons from the Field, Lecture Given for the 
Selected Problems in United Nations Law: State-Building, Governance, and 
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also be true, of course, if a particular Secretary-General places 
less importance on post-conflict efforts. However, given the fact 
that post conflict operations in general are closely linked to the 
three basic values of the organization—security, human rights 
and development—there is reason to believe that the 
Secretaries-General will remain focused on peacebuilding.96 
Secondly, all the Permanent Members of the Security 
Council are part of the Peacebuilding Commission which works 
on the basis of consensus.97 This means that for a 
recommendation of the Peacebuilding Commission to pass, it 
must be approved (or at least not opposed) by the Permanent 
Members of the Security Council. This is relevant not only 
because of the veto power of the Permanent Members of the 
Security Council,98 but also because the Security Council is the 
primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.99 Because post-conflict efforts are an 
essential element of international peace and security, thus 
falling under the mandate of the Security Council,100 if a 
measure is backed by influential members of the Security 
Council, and especially by the permanent members, the 
recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission will have 
significant backing. 
Thirdly, given that the post-conflict efforts occur throughout 
various regions in the world, and that States’ interests are 
dynamically intertwined, it is in the interest of all States to 
have a normative framework established for future actions, 
especially if they are able to join in the effort of creating such a 
framework. That is, it is in the best interest of all states to 
support the Peacebuilding Commission, because post-conflict 
efforts have the potential to have a significant effect on every 
State. Even if a State does not feel the aftereffects of a conflict 
directly, it likely will experience the effects of regional 
instability if a neighbor is subject to such a conflict. 
Fourthly, it has been argued that the United States, not 
being well-suited for post-conflict efforts itself,101 could benefit 
 
Accountability Course at New York University School of Law (Apr. 20, 2006). 
 96. See  U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, §B, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 
(Mar. 21, 2005). 
 97. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, ¶¶ 4(a), 18. 
 98. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
 99. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. 
 100. Mathias Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the 
International Community, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 616- 620 (2001). 
 101. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 253. 
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from the UN’s experience in post-conflict efforts and learn from 
its successes.102 After 9/11, the United States was the most 
adversarial State to a strong UN.103 Today, the United States is 
considered the only remaining national super-power and the 
majority of post-conflict efforts involve either the UN or the 
United States.104 Given these facts and the reality that States 
are motivated by national interests,105 one could say that it is in 
the best interest of the United States to have a strong 
Peacebuilding Commission to implement the international law 
of jus post bellum.106 The support of the United States would 
enhance the chances of effective recommendations by the 
 
 102. Seth G. Jones & James Dobbins, UN Reform: The UN's Record in Nation 
Building, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 723 (2006); Jones and Dobbins have drawn the following 
comparative table, Table 1, which shows that UN led missions are more successful 
than US led missions. Id. at 718. 
Table 1. Nation-building outcomes 
 Country Peaceful in 2005 Democratic in 2005 
 Congo No No
 Namibia Yes Yes
 El Salvador Yes Yes
UN-Led Missions Cambodia Yes No
 Mozambique Yes Yes
 Eastern Slavonia Yes Yes
 Sierra Leone* Yes Yes
 East Timor* Yes Yes
 West Germany Yes Yes
 Japan Yes Yes
 Somalia (UNITAF) No No
US-Led Missions Haiti No No
 Bosnia* Yes Yes
 Kosovo* Yes Yes
 Afghanistan* No ?
 Iraq* No ?
   
* = Ongoing Operation 
Which shows that UN led missions are more successful than US led missions. Id. at 
718. 
 103. CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 10-11. 
 104. Jones & Dobbins, supra note 102, at 722. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.; see generally Chesterman, supra note 2, at 253-56 (contending that the 
United States should implement peace building efforts in order to extend its 
influence). 
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Peacebuilding Commission.107 
Finally, even if the optimal scenario does not become a 
reality, the Peacebuilding Commission could employ techniques 
used by organs with similar problems, such as the Human 
Rights Commission and the human rights treaty bodies. For 
example, naming and shaming tends to produce results—even if 
limited—in international politics.108 These strategies rely upon 
the needs of states to be perceived as legitimate and rule-
abiding in the sense that soft power is relevant to international 
law and international relations.109 Thus, even if a legal sanction 
is not possible, the fact that a state is listed as “not playing the 
game correctly” could lead to a change in its practice and an 
increased reverence towards the rules.110 
Apart from these five reasons for optimism in relation to the 
Peacebuilding Commission, one could argue that a limitation on 
the legal status of its actions, for instance the ability to pass 
recommendations rather than create hard law, is not a problem 
at all since it may assist in the operation of this organ. This is 
due to the fact that doctrine has followed practice in this area, 
meaning that there is no doctrinal consensus on post-conflict 
efforts on which the Peacebuilding Commission can rely.111 
Accordingly, the doctrine might have a more flexible approach to 
evolving circumstances than it would if its proposals were to 
become more than recommendations. 
On the other hand, some countries are still wary of legally 
binding norms in post-conflict efforts, let alone strong doctrinal 
concepts themselves.112 Therefore, having an organ such as the 
Peacebuilding Commission, with persuasive power linked to the 
“diversity and relevance of all those participating,”113 might be 
more palatable to those countries suspicious of legally binding 
norms generally held by organs with stronger powers. 
Another obstacle at the institutional level is that the 
recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission have lower 
priority in international law than the recommendations of other 
 
 107. Jones & Dobbins, supra note 102, at 722-23. 
 108. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD 
POLITICS 93 (1st ed. 2004). 
 109. Id. at 143-46. 
 110. Id. 
 111. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 7. 
 112. Id. at 118-19. 
 113. See UN Peacebuilding Comm’n, Questions and Answers, THE UNITED 
NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION, 
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/qanda.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
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organs.114 As a result, the recommendations of the Peacebuilding 
Commission would have limited legal force,115 diminishing their 
effectiveness. Since the effectiveness of any recommendations 
depends on which organ of the UN acts upon them,116 it may 
turn out that the best application of the Peacebuilding 
Commission’s recommendations may be as a tool for principled 
evaluation.117 Regardless of whether the Commission’s 
recommendations are undertaken, at the very least they would 
serve as a way to evaluate and improve accountability. 
However, if the Security Council acts on the Peacebuilding 
Commission’s recommendations, the recommendations would 
have the effect of something more than just a tool for principled 
evaluation.118 Under those circumstances, the legal force of the 
proposals comes from one of two sources. The Security Council 
could pass a resolution under the authority granted to it by 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which establishes the Security 
Council’s authority to maintain international peace and 
security.119 Furthermore, successive resolutions of the Security 
Council are often read together to form customary law.120 Thus, 
even if Chapter VII of the UN Charter did not apply to a 
particular resolution, the recommendations of the Peacebuilding 
Commission would still have some legal force if the Security 
Council acted on them. This is especially true given that the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council is to maintain 
international peace and security.121 
There are two other potentially meaningful ways that the 
recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission would have 
 
 114. See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 52-59 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (providing information on the sources of international 
law, especially the acts of international organization). 
 115. See generally Id. at 52-53 (finding the limited legal force of the 
recommendations to be derived from the assumption, that for the time being, the 
recommendations of the Peacebuilding Commission would not be codified in a treaty 
sponsored by the UN.  Even if the treaty did come into existence it would not have 
universal acceptance). 
 116. See Id. at 53 (proposing that the decisions of the International Court of 
Justice and the resolutions of the Security Council on international peace and 
security, when taken under Chapter VII, have stronger legal force than other acts of 
the UN). 
 117. Id. 
 118. U.N. Charter art. 25, art. 103. 
 119. See generally Id. at art. 39-51 (according to art. 25, any resolution made 
under Chapter VII is binding on all UN members, and therefore, has legal force). 
 120. This is the idea behind the claim of the existence of a right to humanitarian 
assistance. ALBERTO DO AMARAL, JR., O DIREITO DE ASSISTÊNCIA HUMANITARIA (2003) 
 121. U.N. Charter, supra note 4, at art. 39-51. 
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legal force. If the General Assembly acts on the Peacebuilding 
Commission’s recommendations, the recommendations might be 
ascribed both moral and political power. This can be attributed 
to the sheer gravity of the General Assembly’s influence, in 
which all state members of the UN are included and entitled to 
one vote.122 If this occurred, there would likely be a push for 
compliance based on the international support for the 
resolution, as evidenced by the resolution’s adoption by the 
General Assembly. International democratic approval would 
enhance the legal force of the recommendations, at least in the 
sense that the practice could become international custom if the 
states were to follow it with a conviction of its mandatory 
character. To the contrary, if the Secretary-General or the 
Economic and Social Council act on the recommendation, its 
effectiveness will likely be limited because of the relative lack of 
political power vested in these organs.123 
Similar to other issues of international law, the outcome of 
the Peacebuilding Commission’s recommendations will depend 
most on the political will of the states and other international 
actors. However, the Peacebuilding Commission has all the 
necessary elements to fulfill the institutional gaps of jus post 
bellum within the UN, and any institutional problems are not 
insurmountable. 
III. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION CAN FILL THE 
EXISTING NORMATIVE GAPS IN POST-CONFLICT 
EFFORTS 
Though the previous sections establish that the 
Peacebuilding Commission can bridge the institutional gap in 
post-conflict efforts by the UN, the question remains whether it 
can also play a role in closing the normative gap. This normative 
gap is twofold and encompasses both the need to develop a legal 
framework—for instance, a modern jus post bellum—and the 
need to enhance accountability mechanisms for post-conflict 
efforts. 
 
 
 122. Id. at art. 9, art. 18. 
 123. Id. at art. 61. However, in the same way as in the case of the General 
Assembly, moral and political force can exist and make a difference. 
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A. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION AND JUS POST BELLUM 
The regulation of war has been a theme of interest to 
international law since its beginning.124 Initially, the focus was 
on the justice of war, in which the debate surrounded the issue 
of whether a war was being fought under just motives.125 The 
idea underpinning just war theories is to limit the occurrence of 
war by establishing criteria that would limit the circumstances 
under which a war could be justified.126 The belief was that war 
is inherent to the international scenario, and although total 
elimination of war is not possible, some limitation is necessary 
and beneficial.127 This theory gave rise to jus ad bellum, or the 
right to go to war. 
As time passed and the theories of the law of war developed, 
an additional standard arose. With the evolution of warfare 
came the recognition that civilians too were victims of war.128 
Consequently, a second set of limitations to war arose: jus in 
bello, referring to the restrictions on targets, weapons and types 
of conduct and imposing obligations on belligerents during 
war.129 
These two sets of limitations form the core of international 
humanitarian law and are codified in the Hague Regulations of 
1907,130 the four Geneva Conventions,131 and their Protocols of 
 
 124. See generally HUGO GROTUS, DE JURE  BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (Francis 
W. Kelsey trans., vol. 2 1925) (providing various historical perspectives regarding 
the laws of war). 
 125. See, e.g., RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 53 (1st ed., 1999) 
(frowning upon warfare for glory and advancement, but justifying war for the 
principle of governing inferiors). 
 126. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT 
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 62 (3d ed. 2000) (limiting the justification of war to 
circumstances when there is a wrong received); G.F.S. Soares, Legitimidade de uma 
Guerra Preventia em Pleno 2003? POLITICA EXTERNA, Summer 2003, at 8 – 9. 
 127. See, e.g., TUCK, supra note 125, at 11 (limiting war to instances where there 
is a need for a preemptive strike against an adversary, or acts committed on the 
basis of fear). 
 128. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, art. 13-26, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (defining and establishing 
protections for civilians during war). 
 129. See Antonio Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian 
Law of Armed Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 
55 (1984), for a summary of the main international humanitarian law obligations. 
 130. Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/intro/195?OpenDocument [hereinafter Hague 
Regulations]. 
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1949 and 1977, respectively.132 With the end of the Cold War, the 
increase in ethnic conflicts, and the existence of “failed states,” 
just war theory made a comeback,133 reflecting concerns 
regarding post-conflict events.134 This revival of just war 
theory,135 in connection with post-conflict events,136 led to the 
theory of jus post bellum.137 
Jus post bellum is relevant because the formal end to a 
conflict oftentimes does not typify the post-conflict situation in 
the territories where the war was fought.138 For example, the 
winner of a war rarely exits the territory after the end of the 
conflict, but, on the contrary, often stays and imposes its 
authority.139 The winner’s seemingly permanent presence and 
control over the loser’s territory and affairs gives rise to 
obligations on the part of the former under jus post bellum. 140 
 
 131. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, supra note 128, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]. 
 132. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. It is interesting to note that in 2005 a third protocol was created, 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 558. 
 133. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice: Postwar Legacies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1615, 1620 (2006). 
 134. Recent Publications, 118 HARV. L. REV.524 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL 
WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR (2004)). 
 135. Teitel, supra note 133, at 1620. 
 136. HARV. L. REV., supra note 134, at 524. 
 137. See generally Richard P. DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: 
Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV. 116, 132-40 (2005) (defining jus post 
bellum as the seeking of justice after a war or conflict.  It is believed to comprise 
both the ideas of trials and accountability after a war (and therefore be linked to 
international  criminal tribunals) and with the obligations for a state that stays in 
an occupied territory). 
 138. See Inger Osterdahl, What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine 
Bottles and Old, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 175, 176 (2009) (using the example of 
the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, in which each side defends a 
different legal framework for the territories they dispute). 
 139. More recently this was seen in Iraq, given that the two main goals—the 
search for weapons of mass destruction and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein--were 
achieved early in the conflict, yet the United States stayed on. 
 140. DiMeglio, supra note 139, at 150. 
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Immanuel Kant was among the earliest proponents of this 
theory,141 and the views he espoused were later codified in the 
law of occupation.142 Although the law of occupation developed 
significantly beyond its early stages, the law of occupation is 
still seen as part of the law of war.143 Accordingly, the law of 
occupation is regulated in both the Hague Regulations and the 
Geneva Conventions, which establish a “bill of rights for the 
occupied population” by imposing obligations on an occupying 
power.144 Notwithstanding these regulations, the law of 
occupation is insufficient to regulate modern post-conflict 
efforts. There are three reasons for the law of occupation’s 
insufficiency. 
Firstly, the law of occupation is a fundamental part of the 
broader regulations of the law of war. This overlap is 
problematic because the exercise of control over a foreign 
territory occurs in many situations, and is not isolated to 
circumstances following a formal war.145 It is also problematic 
because the law of war focuses primarily on the conduct of a 
state.146 However, some of the post-conflict efforts are 
undertaken not by states but by international organizations.147 
Secondly, the provisions underlying jus post bellum are 
historically dated. Since the regulations pre-date the emergence 
of an international system of human rights, they do not reflect 
the obligations imposed by this branch of international law.148 
Instead the regulations impose very limited obligations on the 
occupying power.149 Furthermore, because the role of the state 
has evolved since the advent of the welfare state,150 the duties 
imposed by the existing norms do not match the perceived 
 
 141. Id. at 133. 
 142. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3-5 (1993). 
 143. Id. at 4. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 3. 
 146. See, e.g., Hague Regulations, supra note 132, art. 42–56 (imposing 
restrictions on the actions of occupying state forces). 
 147. As in the cases of Kosovo and Timor Leste, in which the UN was the main 
actor in post-conflict efforts. 
 148. For example, the Hague Regulations of 1907 predated the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by forty-one years. 
 149. BENVENISTI, supra note 142, at 7 (“Very few words are used to describe 
both the nature of the occupation regime and the scope of the occupant’s legitimate 
powers.”). 
 150. Nina Beatriz Ranieri, Do Estado Liberal ao Estado Contemporâneo: Notas 
sobre os processos de exaustão dos modelos políticos e da ordem jurídica, 36 REVISTA 
DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL E INTERNACIONAL, 135 (2001) (Braz.). 
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duties of the state. This is because such norms were created in a 
time when states, following a philosophy of political liberalism, 
avoided interference in private activity.151 Today, however, the 
state is more involved in the economic and social life of its 
citizens.152 As a result, the modern role and obligation of the 
state effectively weakens the traditional form of the law of 
occupation. 
The final problem is a practical one. Even though 
occupation is a fact rather than a legal concept,153 most 
occupying powers do not recognize their status as such. Rather, 
the occupying power tries to avoid such a label, and thus the 
application of the law of occupation and any resulting limitation 
to their conduct.154 Simply put, the law of occupation does not 
suffice to adequately regulate modern post-conflict efforts. 
Regardless of whether one interprets such law teleologically or 
historically for purposes of providing guidance or establishing 
minimum requirements for post-conflict obligations,155 there is 
still a need for more comprehensive and specific regulations. In 
response, it seems that the idea of a modern jus post bellum has 
started to gain momentum once more.156 
Although there are controversies about who was the first to 
propose the re-instatement of jus post bellum,157 the relevant 
aspect is the recognition that international law should be 
concerned with the justice of what happens in post-conflict 
efforts. Though there is no direct mention of the development of 
a jus post bellum in the Peacebuilding Commission’s Mandate,158 
there are several reasons why the development of jus post 
bellum could aid the Peacebuilding Commission in reaching its 
 
 151. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 476-78 (expanded ed. 2005). 
 152. BENVENISTI, supra note 142, at 209-10. 
 153. Eyal Benvenisti, Applicability of the Law of Occupation, 99 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L 
L. 29, 29 (2005). 
 154. Id. at 29-30. 
 155. Id. at 30. 
 156. Cf. WALZER, supra note 126, at xi (“But there has been one large and 
momentous shift in both wars and words. The issues that I discussed under the 
name ‘intervention’ (chapter 6), which were peripheral to the main concerns of the 
book, have moved dramatically into the center.”). 
 157.  Compare Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post 
Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant’s Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285, 
289 (2005) (emphasizing Michael Walzer’s book JUST AND UNJUST WARS, published 
in 1977, which addressed questions of post-conflict reconstruction ) with DiMeglio, 
supra note 137, at 133 (attributing Michael Schuck as the first to unequivocally 
reference jus post bellum). 
 158. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10. 
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main purposes. 
Firstly, the Peacebuilding Commission is an ideal forum to 
confront the issue of a uniform normative framework because its 
centralized authority makes it capable of gathering each of the 
relevant parties involved in post-conflict efforts.159 Secondly, the 
law of jus post bellum can contribute to create common 
objectives and values,160 acting as a unifying force within 
potentially divisive multi-cultural and multi-ethnic 
international scenarios. Finally, norms will, at the very least, 
minimize anarchy and, at the most, allow for the co-existence 
and cooperation of States in the international scenario.161 
The need to respond to these concerns became especially 
clear in the wake of the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. In those scenarios the relevant post-conflict efforts were to 
be undertaken by other international actors in addition to the 
U.S., sometimes with the direct involvement of the UN,162 but 
sometimes with its opposition.163 These scenarios highlight the 
 
 159. Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission, 
http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml (last accessed Sept. 22, 2010) 
(One of the Mandate’s goals is, “[t]o bring together all relevant actors to marshal 
resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict 
peacebuilding and recover.”). 
 160. See generally TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATION OF 
STATES 16 (1983) (“To understand international society as an association of states in 
terms of common rules is not to deny that states often cooperate to promote shared 
purposes or that they desire to realize these purposes is an important factor in 
motivating them to observe existing forms and usages.”). 
 161. AMARAL, JR., supra note 120, at 47. 
 162. See e.g., U.N./World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, Oct. 2003, 
available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Joint+Needs+Assessment.pdf 
(discussing the involvement of several international organizations such as the U.N., 
the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in the reconstruction of 
Iraq). 
 163. See generally NewsHour Extra, The Role of the United Nations in a Postwar 
Iraq (Apr. 7, 2003), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Joint+Needs+Assessment.pdf 
(describing how leaders of other countries criticized the U.S. for not creating a more 
“international postwar Iraq,” particularly that the United Nations did not play a 
larger role). Here, one can recall the invasion of Iraq in which the US was able to 
form a coalition with other States – such as the UK and Spain – but failed to obtain 
a specific authorization of the UN Security Council to act. See generally Anthony 
Dworkin, Would War Be Lawful Without Another U.N. Resolution?, CRIMES OF WAR 
PROJECT (Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/news-iraq2.html 
(“In his press conference on March 6, President Bush was asked whether the United 
States would be seen as defiant of the United Nations if it launched a war against 
Iraq without explicit authorization from the Security Council. ‘As we head into the 
21st century, when it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s 
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need for a normative framework to minimize even potential 
violations of international law and underscore the importance of 
principles of justice and legitimacy in post-conflict efforts. In 
addition, such changes would also enormously aid in enhancing 
accountability, which in turn maximizes the perception of 
legitimacy of the UN and of international law as a system. 
Finally, because the Peacebuilding Commission has among 
its tasks the proposal of integrated strategies and the 
improvement of coordination,164 finding a common language of 
action is not only useful but is indispensable. Furthermore, the 
fact that there is no consensus on the political or moral grounds 
for interventions and for post-conflict efforts suggests that a 
common normative framework is the best way to proceed. 
Because the existing normative framework for post-conflict 
efforts is not enough, the Peacebuilding Commission can and 
should play an important role in developing a new legal 
structure in this area. 
B. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A MODERN JUS POST BELLUM MUST 
ADDRESS THREE ISSUES 
The downsides of the Peacebuilding Commission’s mandate 
have been discussed at length: primarily that it has a narrower 
mandate than is ideal, and it is too soon to predict its real 
impact on post-conflict efforts.165 Nevertheless, if the 
Peacebuilding Commission is capable of setting a normative 
framework for post-conflict efforts and can aid the development 
of a modern jus post bellum, its contribution to international 
law could be significant. The task of setting this normative 
framework, however, needs to address the source, the language 
and the content of a modern jus post bellum. 
1. The Source of Jus Post Bellum 
The first question related to the creation of a modern 
normative framework for jus post bellum concerns the source of 
the obligations for post-conflict actors.  It is well established, at 
 
permission,’ the President replied.”). 
 164. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, at 2. 
 165. Accord Gerhard Thallinger, The UN Peacebuilding Commission and 
Transitional Justice, 8 GERMAN L.J. 681, 692 (2007) (declaring the uncertainty of 
whether the UN Peacebuilding Commission will maintain its “narrow, imprecise 
framework” in the future). 
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the very least, that some kind of obligation arises in connection 
with the efforts of post-conflict actors. In fact, the obligation is 
recognized both within and without the UN.166 The Report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of the 
United Nations clearly stated the existence of such an obligation 
when it said, “today, in an era when dozens of States are under 
stress or recovering from conflict, there is a clear international 
obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to 
perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly.”167 
The conduct of the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq 
supports the claim that some obligation towards the local 
population exists.168 
It is, therefore, a fairly settled international norm that a 
post-conflict actor is under obligations as to its behavior after a 
formal conflict has ceased.169 But, this raises a further issue as 
to the nature of these obligations. The first relates to the precise 
point at which such obligations arise. One could say that there 
are two possible options: either there is a more fixed criterion, 
meaning that the obligation arises once a certain objective 
threshold is met or one works with a more malleable criterion in 
which the obligations arise based on the exigency of a particular 
situation. Put another way, should the obligations arise after 
the existence of effective control of the territory? Or should they 
arise once an international actor gets involved in a conflict 
situation that might lead to a post-conflict effort for which 
obligations already exist and are just subjected to a subsequent 
condition? 
If the threshold approach is chosen, a concomitant issue is 
whether this threshold should be defined by legal or practical 
standards. This is relevant because, as discussed above,170 most 
occupying powers deny every claim of occupation, so as to avoid 
 
 166. Cf. Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A 
Critical Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 119, 120 (2010) (describing the increasing involvement of international actors in 
reconstruction efforts). 
 167. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra 
note 35, at 69. 
 168. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 130–32 (Feb. 2, 2005) (exemplifying the U.S’s commitment to 
continue seeking peace and freedom for the Iraqi people). 
 169. See Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
supra note 35, at 69. 
 170. See discussion supra Part III.A 
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the application of the law of occupation.171 If one focuses on post-
conflict efforts undertaken by the UN, this is also relevant. 
Since the organization is not keen on ascribing any conceptual 
definition to the actions it is undertaking, as will be seen 
below,172 it is unclear which obligations apply in a given 
situation. 
2. The Language of Jus Post Bellum 
The awkwardness with which the UN conceptualizes its 
post-conflict efforts leads to another issue that needs to be 
addressed in the establishment of a modern jus post bellum. In 
the area of post-conflict efforts, there are several concepts that, 
although sometimes intertwined, are not used with precision. 
Post-conflict efforts can encompass peace-making,173 
peacekeeping,174 peacebuilding,175 nation-building,176 and state-
building,177 and it is important to clarify each of these terms in 
order to clarify the specific obligations in each of this areas.178 
 
 171. Benvenisti, supra note 140, at 189–90. 
 172. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 
 173.  The UN describes peacemaking as, “the peaceful resolution of armed 
conflict around the word.” Peacemaking and Conflict Prevention, 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacemaking (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2010). 
 174.  The UN defines peace-keeping as “a unique and dynamic instrument 
developed by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict create the 
conditions for lasting peace.” United Nations Peacekeeping, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 175.  The UN describes peace-building as “[b]uilding lasting peace in war-torn 
societies.” Peacebuilding, 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacebuilding (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2010). 
 176. The UN does not use the term nation-building: “Nation-building means 
different things to different people and is not a term used by the UN. It normally 
refers to a longer historical process and includes the building up of a national 
identity.” Peacebuilding Q&A, 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/library_2006peacebuildingt.html (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2010). 
 177.  Although the UN does not directly define state-building, it pledges to 
complete actions that “[l]ead states or territories through a transition to stable 
government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic 
development.” Mission Statement of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/info/mission.shtml (last visited Sept. 23, 2010); 
See also Maria Blackburn,  Head of State, JOHNS HOPKINS MAGAZINE, 
http://www.jhu.edu/jhumag/0904web/fukuyama.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) 
(defining state-building as “constructing formal institutions that make collective life 
in a society possible.”). 
 178. It is interesting to note that even the spelling of the words is not 
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Moreover, in each of these situations the UN may be 
involved in a vast array of actions. These actions can range from 
organizing elections to the international administration of 
territories, each of which encompass different needs and each of 
which could be met with varying degrees of suspicion by 
Member States, depending on how invasive they are judged to 
be given the prevalence of the concept of sovereignty in state’s 
actions and rhetoric.179 For instance, a less “intrusive” mandate 
(such as organizing an election) would likely be welcomed by the 
occupying country, but would likely require fewer obligations 
than other actions, such as the administration of one State.180  If 
the Peacebuilding Commission could aid in clarifying that there 
are different types of post-conflict efforts and differing 
obligations for each, this could be of enormous practical 
significance in developing a framework of action. 
3. The Content of Jus Post Bellum 
The third, and probably the most difficult, aspect that needs 
to be addressed is the content of jus post bellum; for although 
the idea of a jus post bellum has been around since the end of 
the 18th century, its exact contours have never been 
determined.181 There are several suggestions in the scholarship 
of what jus post bellum should encompass. Sonia K. Han 
includes: 1) free and fair elections; 2) democratization; 3) cease-
fire, demobilization, demilitarization and other military aspects; 
4) police force; 5) judicial, penal and other constitutional 
 
consensual. For instance, the word peace-building is found both with a hyphen and 
as one word. 
 179. Clancy Chassay, Suspicion of UN Troops Grows in South Lebanon, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2007), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/23/syria.unitednations (exemplifying 
member-state suspicion of invasive UN peacekeeping action favoring Israel over 
Lebanon). 
 180. See Iraq: Elections Mark Start of New Phase Where National Dialogue 
Vital, Annan Says, UN NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 9, 2005), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr=iraq&Cr1=&NewsID=16880 (“‘The fact 
that the political process has remained on target against an ambitious timetable is a 
considerable achievement in itself given the difficult conditions in which it has taken 
place,’ Secretary-General Kofi Annan says in his report to the Security Council, 
voicing satisfaction that the UN was able to support the Iraqi people at every step of 
the process.”); See also G.A. Res. 54/173, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/173 (Feb. 15, 
2000) (“Acknowledging that the United Nations electoral assistance has facilitated 
the holding of successful elections in several Member States.”). 
 181. See DiMeglio, supra note 137, at 133 (declaring that there was virtually no 
discourse on jus post bellum after Kant’s works in the 18th century until 1994). 
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reforms; 6) respect for human rights; 7) repatriation of refugees 
and other displaced persons; 8) mine clearance; 9) emergency 
relief and humanitarian assistance; and 10) other aspects of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction.182 Michael Schuck has a 
shorter but broader list encompassing repentance, honorable 
surrender, and restoration.183 Michael Walzer, instead of setting 
defined specific criteria, sets a more abstract principle to 
underscore a jus post bellum: “‘better state of peace’. . .. 
‘[B]etter, within the confines of the argument for justice, means 
more secure than the status quo ante bellum, less vulnerable to 
territorial expansion, safer for ordinary men and women and for 
their domestic self-determinations.’”184 
Based on these examples, one could say that not only there 
is not a consensual understanding of the content of a modern jus 
post bellum, but also that there are significant differences in the 
approaches adopted to tackle the issue. These may be explained 
by the fact that the choices in relation to what is necessary for 
justice are driven primarily by subjective concerns. That is, the 
same issue can be seen as indispensable by some and not 
relevant by others. The contrasts involved in selecting the 
content of a jus post bellum may be said to reflect deeper 
contradictions, that (1) often what is needed for immediate relief 
of problems might put long-term strategies in jeopardy;185 (2) 
that peace and justice sometimes may push in different 
directions;186 (3) that responding to security threats and 
protecting human rights sometimes requires contradictory 
actions;187 and (4) that the laws can be used either to maintain 
 
 182. See Han, supra note 24, at 871–75. 
 183. See DiMeglio, supra note 137, at 134–37. 
 184.  Id. at 138 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, at 121–122 
(1977)). 
 185.  See CAPLAN, supra note 20, at 43 (“Satisfying these twin imperatives [, 
immediate needs and long term goals, ] is complicated by the fact that each 
generates its own set of demands and that these demands may not be entirely 
compatible with one another.”); See also CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 146 (“[T]he 
exercise of power by a transitional administration in a manner that contradicts 
principles intended to bind future local regimes—such as democratic principles, the 
rule of law, separation of powers, and respect for human rights—may actually harm 
the prospects of good governance in the longer term.”). 
 186.  See FRANCK, supra note 14, at 14–19 (discussing the difficulties of seeking 
both peace and justice). 
 187.  See CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 146 (“Of particular interest in this 
section are two further aspects of accountability that are relevant to these 
operations. The first concerns the balance that a transitional administration strikes 
between responding to legitimate security threats and its obligation to protect and 
promote human rights.”). 
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the status quo or to propel change.188 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, if one opts for the 
broader approach to defining a modern jus post bellum instead 
of a specific set of substantive rules, one may be able to find 
common ground. Combining the contents expressed above and 
trying to summarize them, a modern jus post bellum should 
encompass a broad notion of law and order, and help establish 
two ideas that are essential for social order: the rule of law and 
physical and economic security. To fully understand and 
properly apply the rule of law, the main concerns are the 
definition of the applicable rule, the respect for minimum 
standards of human rights and the creation of lasting 
institutions (including the judiciary and elections). To properly 
ensure security to citizens of an occupied country, the main 
concerns are policing, the penal system, public order and 
economic stability and development.189 
Another way to justify a broader approach is to look at the 
potential development of a modern jus post bellum through the 
lens of global administrative law, which would support the idea 
of creating frameworks instead of detailed substantive rules. 
Global administrative law is concerned with “all the rules and 
procedures that help ensure the accountability of global 
administration, and it focuses in particular on administrative 
structures, on transparency, on participatory elements in the 
administrative procedure, on principles of reasoned 
decisionmaking, and on mechanisms of review.”190 
Because of this, “[t]he focus of the field of global 
administrative law is not, therefore, the specific content of 
substantive rules, but rather the operation of existing or 
possible principles, procedural rules, review mechanisms, and 
other mechanisms relating to transparency, participation, 
 
 188.  See Teitel, supra note 133, at 1617 (“A core tension emerges in the use of 
law to advance transformation, as opposed to its role in adherence to conventional 
legality.”). 
 189.  For more details on the challenges involved in each of these aspects, see 
CAPLAN supra note 20, at 45-67 (discussing the use of policing and penal institutions 
to maintain public order and internal security); Cf. CHESTERMAN supra note 2, at 
154 (“One of the most important and difficult challenges confronting a post-conflict 
society is the re-establishment of faith in the institutions of the state. Respect for 
the rule of law in particular, implying subjugation to consistent and transparent 
principles under state institutions exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, may face special obstacles.”). 
 190. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 28–28 (2005).. 
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reasoned decisionmaking, and assurance of legality in global 
governance.191 
Following this approach, the Peacebuilding Commission 
could best aid the development of a normative framework for jus 
post bellum by establishing such a framework in a broad, 
principled way, instead of assessing them by their adequacy to 
specific substantive norms. Further justification for this 
approach springs from the recognition of the practical 
differences in post-conflict efforts and in the axiological 
foundation for the choices being made concerning them. In 
addition, a broad approach is also justified given the nature and 
structure of the Peacebuilding Commission, which is, after all, 
merely an advisory organ, with a broad membership, and whose 
actions are based on consensus. Needless to say, defining 
specific substantive norms in this environment would be a 
Herculean task. 
Moreover, having this broad framework would mean that 
the UN itself would be acting under principles of rule of law, 
and would be able to “lead by example.” This could minimize the 
criticisms that often arise in connection with post-conflict efforts 
regarding principles of liberalism and democracy.192 A broad 
framework, therefore, would also increase the legitimacy of UN 
actions by establishing a principled way in which to conduct 
these actions, which would be based on a comprehensive 
foundation, given the membership of the organization. 193 
The lack of specific substantive norms could, however, be 
seen as problematic, because the status quo—the nonexistence 
of clear and specific obligations—would remain. This might, of 
course, allow for violations based on varying interpretations of 
the broader norms. The existence of specific substantive norms 
themselves, however, could also be problematic, because past 
 
 191. Id, 28–29 
 192.  See Sujit Choudhry, Old Imperial Dilemmas and the New Nation-Building: 
Constitutive Constitutional Politics in Multinational Polities, 37 CONN. L. REV. 933, 
933 (2005) (“Practiced in this form, nation-building poses a serious dilemma for 
liberal democrats, because of the deep and irreconcilable tension between the 
outside imposition of a constitutional order and the right of all peoples to self-
determination.”). 
 193.  Furthermore, the idea of a broad framework is also more in keeping with 
the idea of just war theories insofar as they provide “‘relevant principles that are 
intelligible, generalizable, and capable of consistent application,’” L. Christian 
Marlin, A Lesson Unlearned: The Unjust Revolution in Rwanda, 1959-1961, 12 
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1271, 1276 (1988) (quoting Ralph B. Potter, War and Moral 
Discourse 62 (1969)),  and could add to legitimacy by focusing on principles of justice 
for post-conflict efforts. 
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practices have shown that applying the same model of post-
conflict efforts to different situations is not a successful 
strategy.194 
Notwithstanding the problems in defining the content of a 
modern jus post bellum, there is reason to believe that the 
Peacebuilding Commission can aid in the development of a 
normative framework for post-conflict efforts through the 
clarification of the concepts related to jus post bellum. It can 
also, at a minimum, contribute to a broad framework that would 
serve as a principled way to assess post-conflict efforts. 
Moreover, the Peacebuilding Commission can assist the creation 
of a modern normative framework for post-conflict efforts by 
enhancing accountability mechanisms. 
IV. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION CAN BE USED AS 
A TOOL TO ENHANCE THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF POST-
CONFLICT ACTORS 
Accountability is a way of constraining power.195 It “implies 
that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of 
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their 
responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose 
sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not 
been met.”196 In this sense it “presupposes a relationship 
between power-wielders and those holding them accountable 
where there is a general recognition of the legitimacy of (1) the 
operative standards for accountability and (2) the authority of 
the parties to the relationship (one to exercise particular powers 
and the other to hold them to account).”197 Combining these 
features with current international circumstances and, adding 
to it the tendency of looking into accountability solely through 
the lens of legal mechanism, it is difficult to suggest that a 
strong accountability mechanism exists in international law. 
 
 194.  Cf. CHESTERMAN, supra note 2, at 256 (“Just as generals are sometimes 
accused of planning to refight their last war, so the United Nations experiments in 
transitional administration have reflected only gradual learning. Senior UN officials 
now acknowledge that, to varying degrees, Kosovo got the operation that should 
have been planned for Bosnia four years earlier, and East Timor got that which 
should have been sent to Kosovo.”). 
 195.  Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power 
in World Politics, 99 (1) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005). 
 196. Id. at 29. 
 197. Id. at 29. 
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A. THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION CAN USE SEVERAL NON-
LEGAL MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY TO CHECK THE ACTIONS 
OF POST-CONFLICT ACTORS 
This difficulty is exacerbated by the problems in the 
institutional and normative framework of accountability 
enforcement, which, as discussed at length above, is the case in 
post-conflict efforts. If there are no clear rules, legal 
accountability is almost impossible. When there are rules, but 
the remedies available are too lax, legal accountability seems to 
be difficult. Legal accountability, however, is not the only 
possible form of accountability; and one can argue that 
depending on the context in which accountability is to be 
enforced, the forms and mechanisms of accountability may 
vary.198 
Regarding the forms of accountability, Grant and Keohane 
suggests that there are two main types: the participation model 
and the delegation model.199 In the former, the evaluation of 
actions is undertaken by those directly affected by them, and in 
the latter, the evaluation is done by the ones delegating the 
power to act.200 Generally, these two models do not coincide, but 
in the case of post-conflict efforts, both forms of accountability 
are relevant and needed, insofar as both the people in the 
territory in which the effort is being undertaken and the UN (or 
the international community at large) have interests in being 
able to hold actors involved in the efforts accountable. 
Within these two models, Grant and Keohane identify seven 
possible types of accountability: hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, 
legal, market, peer and public or reputational. “Hierarchical 
accountability is a characteristic of bureaucracies and of 
virtually any large organization.”201 Supervisory accountability 
relates to the possibility of an organization to oversee its own 
agents, that is, it concerns relations between organizations 
“where one organization acts as principal with respect to 
specified agents.”202 Fiscal accountability refers to the ability of 
 
 198. For instance, on the issue of private military companies Laura A. Dickinson 
sets 4 types of accountability (i.e. legal, democratic, contractual and institutional). 
See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the 
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 Wm. & Mary 135, 135 
(2005). 
 199. Grant & Keohane, supra note 195, at 31. 
 200. Id. at 31. 
 201. Id. at 36. 
 202. Id. at 36. 
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funding agencies to require that the recipient of funds report 
back to them.203 “Legal accountability refers to the requirement 
that agents abide by forma rules and be prepared to justify their 
actions in those terms, in courts or quasi-judicial arenas.”204 
“Market accountability” relates to market agents (such as 
investors and consumers) overseeing actions.205 “Peer 
accountability arises as the result of mutual evaluation of 
organizations by their counterparts,”206 and 
“[p]ublic/reputational accountability is pervasive because 
reputation is involved in all the other forms of accountability.”207 
Under this rubric, even if the Peacebuilding Commission is not 
able to develop a modern jus post bellum which ensures the 
existence of legal rules that, in turn, ensures legal 
accountability, it certainly can play a major role in other forms 
of extra-legal accountability. 
In relation to hierarchical and supervisory accountability, 
the role of a body such as the Peacebuilding Commission is 
intuitive, given its placement within the UN, and its mandate to 
coordinate the organization’s post conflict efforts. This is 
especially true when the Peacebuilding Commission undertakes 
country-specific missions. The actors on the field in such 
situations would be subject to the Peacebuilding Commission 
supervision, and therefore, would be held accountable for their 
actions. 
Regarding fiscal accountability and peer accountability, the 
Peacebuilding Commission, due to its composition, also has an 
important role to play. In relation to fiscal accountability, 
accountability will certainly exist because the Peacebuilding 
Commission unites each of the major donors and financial 
institutions involved in post-conflict efforts.208  In relation to 
peer accountability, because the idea is to have an organ to 
coordinate strategies, and because all actors involved in post-
conflict efforts will be present at the same forum and will, 
therefore, act as a check upon each other, the Peacebuilding 
Commission will enhance accountability among them. 
Public or reputational accountability seems, however, the 
most promising area in which the Peacebuilding Commission 
 
 203. Id. at 36. 
 204. Id. at 36. 
 205. Grant & Keohane, supra note 195, at 37. 
 206. Id. at 37. 
 207. Id. at 37. 
 208. G.A. Res. 60/180, supra note 10, at 3. 
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can enhance accountability in post-conflict efforts. Firstly, 
because the Peacebuilding Commission is an institutionalized 
forum for discussion, adding the element of transparency into 
the debate of post-conflict efforts will enhance accountability, in 
the sense that it will present the positions of the involved actors 
openly, so that they can be objectively assessed and evaluated.209 
Secondly, if the Peacebuilding Commission is able to establish 
the broad normative framework mentioned above, and from that 
is able to establish a principled way of assessing the standards 
of post-conflict efforts, this method would enhance 
accountability because standards of legitimacy are 
indispensable to holding actors accountable.210 Thirdly, as Grant 
and Keohane suggest, one important problem of international 
accountability appears when the actors involved are powerful 
states with constitutional democracies.211 Because these states 
are nationally accountable, it is difficult to hold these states 
legally accountable internationally. “The only forms of external 
accountability to which they are consistently subject, across a 
range of issue areas, are peer accountability and reputational 
accountability.”212 Furthermore, “[t]hese attempts at 
accountability, however, depend on efforts, often ad hoc, to 
establish a basis of legitimacy on which to hold a state 
accountable.”213  The actions of the Peacebuilding Commission 
can thus be an important step towards establishing these forms 
of accountability insofar as all the powerful states are in one 
way or another involved in post-conflict situations. Moreover, 
because it is an established organ and not an ad hoc effort, 
perhaps it can be more successful than envisioned by Grant and 
Keohane. 
B. NON-LEGAL MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY WILL ENHANCE 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
If these were the only types of accountability that the 
Peacebuilding Commission was able to impose, it would already 
be a positive development in both post-conflict efforts and in 
international law. Depending on how far the Peacebuilding 
Commission is able to advance the establishment of a modern 
 
 209. Grant & Keohane, supra note 195, at 39. 
 210. Id. at 29–30. 
 211. Id. at 39. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id 
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jus post bellum, however, it could also aid in improving legal 
accountability. This would entail a further step in developing 
jus post bellum: clarifying concepts and obligations alone is not 
sufficient—it is also necessary to establish remedies for 
violations. Mechanisms used by the Trusteeship Council, 
including period reports and in loco visits, are one possible 
solution,214 but this alone will not suffice. Harsher sanctions 
must be imposed both upon individuals and upon the State or 
organization that undertakes the post-conflict effort. This 
requires a new reading of immunity rules and the political 
compromise either to make the existing avenues for remedies 
(such as the International Criminal Court) more effective or to 
create new paths to accountability. Since the scholarship on the 
issue is in its early stages, it is not yet possible to state clearly 
what types of remedies should be used in such situations.  
However, the issue of accountability is paramount in the area of 
post-conflict efforts, and, therefore, in the work of the 
Peacebuilding Commission. 
V. CONCLUSION 
From the forgoing, one can see that the Peacebuilding 
Commission is a long-needed institutional reform of the UN 
insofar as it aims to enhance activities already being performed 
by the institution in the area of post-conflict efforts215. It seems 
that the Peacebuilding Commission indicates the existence of a 
consensus concerning obligations in post-conflict efforts—that 
is, the existence of a jus post bellum in broad terms.216 At the 
same time, this area of international law is just starting,217 but 
it is potentially capable of broadening these obligations to 
include current situations and to establish a normative 
framework that would enhance the rights of local populations 
 
 214. See CHESTERMAN supra note 2, at 39–40 (“The Council’s basic 
responsibilities were to consider reports from the administering power, to accept 
petitions from inhabitants, and to provide for periodic visits.”); See also Mohamed 
supra note 84, at 829–30 (“Transferring management to the Trusteeship Council 
thus provides an avenue for holding UN personnel accountable for their actions and 
holding the UN to the same standards that it seeks to impose on the territories in 
which it operates.”). 
 215. See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra. 
 216. See generally G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180, supra. 
 217. See generally Richard P. DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: 
Defining Jus Post Bellum and Inger Osterdahl, What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of 
New Wine Bottles and Old, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 
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and ensure accountability.218 
Even though it is not what was initially proposed and 
desired,219 the Peacebuilding Commission seems to be able to 
contribute to post-conflict efforts. And, like most actors in the 
international legal scenario, the most successful strategy would 
be to find the niches in which it can be most effective and 
contribute the most to international law. 
Potentially, and in light of the nature and structure of the 
Peacebuilding Commission and of the need of post-conflict 
efforts, the most profitable niche it could fill would include 
developing a broad framework for post-conflict efforts,220 which 
would help to clarify concepts of modern jus post bellum and 
establish a principled way of assessing the law in this area. This 
would, n addition, enhance accountability221 through increased 
transparency,222 and create a standardized way of evaluating 
post-conflict actions223 being taken. 
If the Peacebuilding Commission is able to fill these gaps, it 
would not only fulfill its mandate—thereby helping the UN 
meet its goals—it would also contribute significantly to 
international governance and international law. 
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